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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DIANE FAVA:TELLA, by and
through her Guardian Ad
Litem, FE'LIX E.
FAVATELLA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JEAN W. POULSEN and
MARY E LLEN CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10264

1

APPELLANTS' BR'IEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence action for personal injuries
by the Guardian Ad Litem of a seven-year old
child against the defendant driver of an automobile
in which the child was riding when injured.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the pre-trial, the lower court denied the
Motion of the defendant driver, Mary Ellen Carter,
to dismiss the Compl1aint of the plaintiff against
her.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant and appellant, Mary Ellen Carter,
wan ts an Order from this court directing the lower
court to grant her Motion to dismiss the Complaint
of the plaintiff against her.
1

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
On December 2, 1964, this court granted the
appellant, Mary Ellen Carter's petition for an Interlocutory Appeal. (R 25)
In the Complaint in Civil Case No. 140856,
the plaintiff alleges that on ,January 7, 1963, she
was a passenger in an automobile being driven by
the defendant, Mary Ellen Carter, and at that time
she was seven years of age. The Complaint does
not allege wilful misconduct or intoxication on the
part of the defendant driver, nor does the Complaint allege that the seven-year old plaintiff or
her pai·ents made payment for the ride. (R 1, 2,
and 3)
At the pre-trial, it was stipulated and agreed
that the minor plaintiff made no payment for the
ride in question, nor did her parents make any payment, and that she was riding as a convenience to
her parents, and that this arrangement was made
'between the driver and the parents of the minor
child, and the minor child had no part in making
the arrangement. (R 9)
The defendant, Jean W. Poulsen, was the driver
of a second car involved in the collision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF IS BARTIED FROM RECOVERY
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT,
MARY ELLEN CARTER, BECAUSE AT THE TIME
OF THE INJURY, THE PLAINTIFF WAS A GUEST

IN THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVEN BY MARY ELLEN
CARTER.

The issue before the court is:
Was the plaintiff, Diane Favatella, a sevenyear old child, a guest at the time of injury, inasmuch as her parents 1arranged for the ride for her
with the defendant driver?
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
reads as follows:
"Responsibility of owner or driver of a vehicle to a guest. - Any person, who as a guest
accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving upon
any of the public highways of the State of
Utah, and while so riding as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have no
right of recovery against the owner or driver
or person responsible for the operation of such
vehicle. In the event that such person while
so riding as such guest is killed, or dies as a
result of injuries sustained while so riding
as such guest, then neither the estate nor the
legal representative or heirs of such guest
shall have any right of recovery against the
driver or owner of said vehicle by reason of
the death of said guest. If such person so
riding as a giwst be a minor and sustain an
injury or be killed or die as .a result of injury
sustained while so riding as such guest, then
neither the parents nor guardians nor the
estate nor legal representatives or heirs of
such minor shall have any right of recovery
against the driver or: owner ~r pers_on respo_nsible for the operation of said vehicle for injury sustained or as a result of the death of
sucli minor. Nothing in this section shall be
3

construed as relieving the owner or driver or
person responsible for the operation of a vehicle from liability for injury to or death of
such guest proximately resulting from the
intoxication or wilful misconduct of such owner, driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle; provided, that in :any
action for death or for injury or damage to
person or proper'ty by or on behalf of a guest
or the estate, heirs or legal representatives of
such guest, the burden shall be upon plaintiff
to establish that such intoxication or wilful
misconduct was the proximate cause of such
death or injury or damage."
'Section 41-9-2 defines guest as follows:
"Guest defined - For the purpose of this
section, the term 'guest' is hereby defined as
being a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor."
In Welker vs. Sorenson (1957) 209 Or. 402,
306 P. 737, the problem presented in this case is
discussed in a situation where an action was brought
for the wrongful death of a twenty-nine-month old
child, who was a guest passenger at the time of the
accident. In Welker vs. Sorenson, supra, the court
rsaid:
"The identical question, under similar fiacts,
was presented in Buckner vs. Vetterick, 124
Cal. App. 2d, 417, 269 P. 2d, 67, 68, and the
Court held that the child's status was determined by that of the mother. After referring
to the policy of the guest statute as explained
in previous decisions of the California Courts
it was said:
·1

'* * * Thus, under the legislatively declared public policy of this state, the
mother of plaintiffs, who was injured in
accident, cannot recover from the defendant. As she had the responsibility
of their care and direction. It was her
decision that determined whether they
should go on this trip. In accepting the
ride for hersel'f and deciding to take the
children along, she also accepted for them.
Otherwise, we would have the anomalous
situation of the mother who made the
decision being a guest and her infant
children not being guests and their status with respect to the operator of the
car being different from that of their
mother, with the result that during the
trip the driver would owe a different
degree of oare to the chil'dren from that
which she owed to their mother. Such a
differentiation is both illogical and out
of harmony with the purpose of Section
403 of the vehicle code. It would therefore seem both reasonable and logical to
say that when a parent accepts a ride as
1a guest of the operator and takes along
her small children, she also accepts the
ride for them, and they have the same
status with relation to the driver on
such ride that the parent has. Therefore,
since the mother was a guest, the children were guests, and none of them could
recover as only simple negligence was involved."
In Indiana, in Whitfield vs. Bruegel ( 1963)
134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E. 670, where the father
of a minor child had given a great aunt unrestricted
5

custody of minor child, and where child without permission of father visited great ,aunt and where great
aunt while operating an automobile drove into a
parked car and injured the child, the Indiana court,
sitting, In Banc, rejected the contention the child
was not a guest because she could not give requisite
consent and held the child to be a guest. The Court
said there seemed to be no reason why a natural
guardian could not accept an invitation for a child
to take a ride.
In Horst vs. Holtzen (1958) 149 Iowa, 958, 90
N.W. 2d, 41, where the mother of the plaintiff, a
thirteen-day old infant asked the defendant to drive
her and the plaintiff to a meeting, and the defendant granted such permission, the court held the infant was a guest in the defendant's automobile notwithstanding the fact that infant might have been
incapable of accepting an invitation to ride and said
lower court properly directed a verdict for the defendant.
In Lynott vs. Sells (1958) 52 Del. 385, 158 A.
2'd, 583, where a five-year old minor rode with the
defendant motorist with the infant minor's mother's
express consent, the court held the infant was not
excluded from the operation of the automobile guest
statute as a matter of law.
In Morgan vs. Anderson (1939) 149, Kan. 814,
89 P. 2d, 866, where a seven-year old child, left to
the unrestricted custody of driver, was taken on an
automobile trip and injured while in vVyoming and
6

where the Wyoming law provided that no person
transported by the owner or opera:tor of the motor
vehicle as his guest with out payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages
against such operator for injury unless such accident shall be caused by gross negligence or wilful
or wanton misconduct, the Kansas Court sustained
a demurrer in favor of the defendant driver dismissing the case as a matter of law.
And again, in In Re vVrights Estate (1951)
170 Kan. 600, 228, P. 2d, 911, where a four-year
old child was left to the unrestricted care and custody
of child's grandparents, the four-year old child was
held a guest within the meaning of Kansas guest
statute, even though incapable of accepting a ride.
In Letterel vs. Cerniglia (1948) 274 App. Div.
896, 82 N.Y. 2d, 670, an eleven-year old child accompanying her mother and step-father was held a
guest as a matter of law within the meaning of the
Ohio guest statute, which provided owner of motor
vehicles is not liable for injuries to a guest transported without payment unless injury is caused by
wilful misconduct.
In Tilghman vs. Rightor (1947) 211, Ark. 229,
199, S.W. 2d 943, where three boys, ages seven, nine
,and fourteen flagged a truck and obtained a ride
they were held guests within the statute and court
declared in defining guests the statute made no exception in favor of minors.
7

In Schlitz vs. Pictor (1938) 66, S.D. 3Ul, 220
N.W. 2d, 519, a ten-year old boy was held a guest
within the meaning of the guest statute of South
Dakota.
In what may be the Latest California case
Buckner vs. Vetterick (19'54) 124 C.A. 2d 417 269 '
' Appeals
'
'
P. 2d, 67, the California Digtrict Court of
held children were guests where a mother accepted
a ride and took her two children, ages fifteen months
and twenty-six months along. This decision is particularly important in view of other Ca'lifornia Supreme Court holdings to the effe~t a child of minor
age is not a guest where the ride was given to the
child without the consent or permission of the parent.
In Haarstrich vs. Oregon Shortline Railroad
Company (1927) 70 U. 552, 26'2 P. 100, where an
action was brought .against Railroad Corn pany for
injury sustained by a fifteen-year old girl, injured
in a crossing collision, and where the fifteen-year
old girl accepted the invitation of the owner of the
automobile to ride and where the automobile was
driven by another with the owner's permission, and
where it w,as shown that she had no control over
the operation of the car, this court held that the
fifteen-year old minor was a guest as a matter of
law.
The purpose of guest statutes is to relieve a generous driver who is sued by an invited rider for
ordinary negligence of the driver, in a situation
where the rider gives nothing to compensate for the
8

transportation. Just as a dog should not bite the
hand which feeds it, a generous driver should not
be sued by a person who gives nothing by way of
compensation for the ride. Further, if the purpose
of the guest law is to be accomplished, it seems that
the reasoning of the California court in Buckner vs.
Vetterick, supra, and the Oregon ·court in Welker vs.
Sorenson, is logical and sound.
When children are visiting business premises
with their mother or other custodians, invariably the
children are held to be business invitees even though
they have no intention of buying anything for themselves and no invitation has been issued to them.
In that situa:tion, the mother impliedly accepts the
invitation and if an acceptance is require'd by a
child riding in a vehicle to be a guest, impliedly, it
wou.ld seem the acceptance of the parents is sufficient, and since Diane Favatella's parents arranged
for the ride, an acceptance was made on her behalf.
CONCLUSION
The lower court should be directed to grant the
defendant and appellant, M1airy Ellen Carter's Motion to Dismiss.
Respectfully subm'i tted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY
Attorney for the
Defendant-Appellant
1473South11th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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I hereby certify that on this ____________________ day of
____________________________________ , 1965, I mailed two copies of
this Brief by United States mail, postage prepa1id,
to Ernest F. Baldwin, and two copies to Dwight L.
King, at the addresses shown on this Brief.
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